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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues the obvious, but still widely neglected point that for 
successful state building to occur in the post-Cold War era, nationalism remains 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a stable modern 
nation-state. Nationalism is both the key to state building and the central element 
in any explanation of the limitations of the modern nation-state and the system of 
sovereign nation-states in the early 21st century. Without a genuinely unifying 
nationalism and a strong sense of national identity, underpinned by the provision 
of goods and services, a modern nation-state is nothing but an ineffective 
bureaucratic edifice masquerading as a modern sovereign nation-state. Despite 
the post-Cold War resurgence in the theory and practice of state building (or 
nation building), the crucial role of nationalism receives virtually no attention. The 
term nationalism is used here in the deepest sense possible: it is not being used 
to describe a superficial agreement that ‘we are all Iraqis now’ or ‘all Afghanis 
now’ because ‘we’ elected a new government, usually under the auspices of the 
United Nations and ostensibly responsible for the ‘national’ territory within which 
‘we’ live. The central point of this thesis is that despite its apparent obviousness, 
nationalism remains completely marginalized in the contemporary debate about 
the theory of, and the practice of state building. To put it in anthropomorphic 
terms, contemporary exercises in state building (or nation building) are wittingly, 
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I. THE WORLD HAS BECOME NORMAL AGAIN, OR HAS IT? 
For the secret of man’s being is not only to live, but to have 
something to live for. Without a stable conception of the object of 
life, man would not consent to go on living, and would rather 
destroy himself than remain on earth.1 – Dostoevsky 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Is it simply enough to exist, or is there more? The question of purpose is 
one of the fundamental themes in human history. It is one of existence, and one 
that demands resolution. The answer to this question lies, in part, in the fact that 
all of us seek to live for something, and to the degree we do not, we begin to die 
inside. And, as we die, we end as an empty husk of humanity.  
This search for meaning has in times past, and will in times ahead, push 
humanity to organize around ideas and institutions and the symbols that embody 
them. Symbols have meaning and symbols inform action. There is a cycle that 
exists between belief and action where they reinforce and spur one another 
forward.2 Within this cycle of belief and action, a degree of correlation is formed 
between the strength of a belief and the depth of its penetration into one’s 
worldview, where the more potent the strength of the belief, the deeper it 
penetrates into the individual.3 It is at this point that symbols and actions deepen 
the individual or collective sense of purpose; resolving the tension, of which 
Dostoevsky speaks. Moreover, in our increasingly pluralistic age, symbol and 
meaning are exceedingly relevant to the central question that this thesis seeks to 
                                            
1  Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, ed. Ralph Matlaw, trans. Constance Garnet, 
A Norton Critical Edition ed. (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), 235. 
2 For a discussion of the necessity for understanding both the orthopraxis and orthodoxy in 
relation to belief see Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1996). 
3  Heather Gregg, "Religious Dimensions of Culture" In The Culture Handbook (Santa 
Monica: RAND, Forthcoming). 
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answer. Why have some nation-states ‘succeeded’, while others have ‘failed’ and 
what are the implications for the theory and practice of state building?  
The argument made here is that some nation-states have ‘succeeded’ 
while others have ‘failed’ precisely because ‘successful’ nation-states have a 
higher degree of ‘nation-ness’. The strength of the nation-state is dependent 
upon the degree that the nation exists as an idea and a practice, across the 
bounded space over which the state claims sovereignty and is recognized as 
sovereign by other sovereign nation-states. The answer to the fundamental 
question of purpose and meaning then for the state is that it exists to the degree 
that its citizens perceive it to exist (and to the degree that other sovereign nation-
states recognize its existence) and there is an ongoing exchange of obligations 
and rights that reinforce loyalty to the nation-state. Perhaps, this is to some, a 
seemingly irrelevant question in an increasingly globalized world. A world in 
which there is much talk of the end, the decline, or the crisis of the nation-state 
and/or the nation-state system. 
For many, the move beyond the nation-state was a promising 
development. As Robert Kagan observed in his short work, The Return of History 
and the End of Dreams, there was a brief moment when the Berlin Wall fell in 
1989 and a glimpse of a world made new was possible. A world where nation-
states both grew together and disappeared: cultures intermingled, and borders 
opened, more than ever before, to both trade and people.4 This moment was one 
in which the cosmopolitan ideal was actualized for more than the affluent. It was 
a moment where everyone would perhaps become a global citizen.  
Yet, this dream quickly ended. The world became normal again. The world 
that exists today is one where nation-states, or parts of nation-states and the 
people who live there, are not only transformed by the power of globalization, but 
are also often set against the process, which necessarily reorders and reforms 
                                            
4  Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2008), 3. 
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the relations between state, society, and the global order. This thesis is not 
arguing that this will always be the case, or that the dream that was briefly 
glimpsed by many as the Berlin Wall came down (and celebrated by many as the 
‘end of history’) will not one day come to pass, only that it is not yet upon us. 
Instead, as Benedict Anderson notes in Imagined Communities:  
Every year the United Nations admits new members… many ‘old 
nations’ once thought fully consolidated, find themselves 
challenged by ‘sub’-nationalisms within their borders – nationalisms 
which, quite naturally, dream of shedding this sub-ness one happy 
day. The reality is quite plain: the ‘end of the era of nationalism,’ so 
long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the 
most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time. 
[Italics added]5 
Indeed, the nation-state remains as active today as it was in 1945. Although the 
United States is now the sole ‘super power’, international competition between 
lesser, or aspiring ‘great’ powers has returned. Russia, Europe, Japan, China, 
India, and Iran, among others, are increasingly seeking to carve out positions in 
the changing world order.6 It is perhaps with a hint of irony that these aspiring 
great powers are again contesting the right to resources and self-determination in 
the post-Soviet era in much the same way as they did in the post 1945 era, if not 
as coldly. 
Not all agree with this assessment of the present condition of the world; 
that powerful states are again on the rise. For example, Phil Williams argues that 
the increasing number of failed, or failing, states are indicative of the demise of 
the state building project and the eventual passing of the nation-state system. 
Moreover, this trend has the potential to spawn a new “Dark Age.”7 Others argue 
that globalization has already transformed state sovereignty to the point, where 
                                            
5  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2006), 3. 
6  Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, 3. 
7 See Phil Williams, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State 
and U.S. Strategy (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008). 
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we have entered the era of what Phillip Bobbitt has called “the market state,” 
where the market has replaced the state as the legitimate source of provision of 
goods and services to the people.8 While true in part, these positions, amongst 
many that have either called for or lamented the end of the nation-state, do not 
offer a complete picture of the current character of the global order, nor do they 
offer a blueprint for future action.  
In Fixing Failed States, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart adeptly identify 
the current problem. They argue that the central issue facing states today is the 
“sovereignty gap” between, “the de jure sovereignty that the international system 
affords…and their de facto capabilities to serve their populations and act as 
responsible members of the international community.”9 The reality is that a large 
and growing number of states today do not deliver security and development to 
their citizens. Put simply, there is a need for the state to do what it is supposed to 
do. It is not enough for states to be sovereign; there is also a necessity for the 
delivery of goods and services to their constituents, which will in turn invigorate 
the extraction of obligations from the citizens. It is against this backdrop, along 
with the need for an understanding of the transitional character of the changing 
global order and the increase in the number of failing states that this thesis 
argues that nationalism plays a vital role in the success of any state building 
project. 
B. THE ARGUMENT 
The 1990s saw an explosion in the study of state failure and nation 
building.10 Taking this renewed interest in nation building as its point of departure 
                                            
8 See Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (Knopf, 
2002). 
9  Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a 
Fractured World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3-4. 
10  Mark T. Berger, "From Nation Building to State Building: The Geopolitics of Development, 
the Nation-State System and the Changing Global Order" In From Nation Building to State 
Building, ed. Mark T. Berger (New York: Routledge, 2008), 5. 
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this thesis moves beyond the current debate surrounding nation-state building, 
namely the focus on bureaucratic-technical means, and links a serious and 
detailed consideration of nationalism to the theory and practice of state building. 
There has thus far been no effort to bring the two fields of study (nationalism on 
the one hand, and state building on the other) into alignment. This is somewhat 
puzzling in that the nation-state, by definition, is both a nation and a state. To 
focus on the state, to the exclusion of the nation, is to seek a technocratic 
solution that satisfies only half of the equation: it is as suggested an exercise in 
identifying and strengthening the body, while neglecting the soul. 
More specifically this thesis argues that modern nationalism has since its 
appearance always been and still is, the necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for the emergence of a stable, modern nation-state. Moving outward from this 
assumption, this thesis argues that nationalism is central to both successful state 
building and to a proper understanding of the limits of the development of nation-
states in the early 21st century. Without nationalism, a modern nation-state is 
nothing but a shambling bureaucratic beast that confronts, ever increasing limits 
on its ability to provide even the minimum basic requirements to the citizens that 
live within its territory. 
The RAND study, America’s Role in Nation Building: from Germany to 
Iraq, nicely encapsulates the neglect of nationalism in the theory and practice of 
the state building when it blithely observes that:  
What principally distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan are not their levels of 
Western culture, economic development, or cultural homogeneity. 
Rather it is the level of effort the United States and the international 
community put into their democratic transformations. Nation 
building, as this study illustrates, is a time and resource-consuming 
effort.11  
                                            
11  James Dobbins, America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2003), xix. 
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This argument views nation-building projects as primarily the result of what some 
consider “hard power.” Specifically, the RAND study and other books in this vein 
focus on the tools of organized violence, state institutions, and economic/political 
policy instruments. The solution set becomes in this view, one where the answer 
is simply more money and more soldiers. This thesis by contrast argues that the 
crucial ingredient in the state building project is “nation-ness”. This is because 
unlike state building, which relies on “material factors,” nation building (I am 
drawing a clear distinction here between state building and nation building—a 
topic discussed in detail below—even though many policy-makers use the terms 
interchangeably) centers on “soft power”, such things as state sponsored 
education, national media, and the propagation of national myths and stories.12  
This thesis does not deny the validity of “hard power” in state building. 
However, it does argue that to rely primarily, if not exclusively, upon throwing 
money and soldiers at a problem with an emphasis on building a larger 
administrative and technocratic structure is to invite disaster. Instead, there is 
need for a more holistic approach that incorporates elements of both state 
building and nation making. The holistic approach argued for here will be 
described in Chapter 3 via the Nation-State Congruence Model, which will 
demonstrate that the state-centric approach is not only incorrect, but is actively 
contributing to the failure of a number of state building projects. 
C. DEFINING THE TERMINOLOGY: NATION AND STATE BUILDING, 
DEVELOPMENT, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE NATION-STATE 
Americans, in their abuse of the English language have not only fostered 
the misuse of the terms nation building and state building, but have also 
misconstrued what reconstruction vis-à-vis development means. The lack of 
clarity about these terms has led to great confusion on the part of many involved 
in state building projects. The misuse of terminology is evident in Michael 
                                            
12  Benjamin Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War 
and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 71. 
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Barnett’s article, “Nation Building’s New Face”, where he says that nation 
building is the, “practice of helping countries overcome conflict and build effective 
political institutions.”13 Americans often use the term nation building to refer to 
the construction of a new political order with little or no regard for the peoples, 
cultures, and traditions already present.14 Nation building, as used above, is 
actually state building, or more precisely, institution building or capacity 
building.15 State building consists of the consolidation of the means of, and the 
monopoly over, the right to use violence, the growing of institutions to extract 
resources from the population and territory it controls to support security and 
policing activities and the provision of material benefits to the citizens of the 
state. By contrast, if nation building is going to have any precision as a term, it 
should refer to state-sponsored public education, the role of the media, and the 
propagation of national myths. The end goal of nation building is the merging of 
the population into a “more cohesive people with a common history, leading to 
the evolution of a national identity and transforming the centralized state into an 
integrated nation-state.”16 State building is about building institutional capacity, 
nation building is about building national identity. 
There has also been a great deal of misuse of the terms reconstruction 
and development. Reconstruction is the restoration of a war torn society to 
something resembling its pre-conflict condition. Development, however, refers to 
the establishment of institutions where there was none previously, or at least a 
fundamental transformation and/or modernization of pre-existing institutions. 
When used with qualification (as in political development, or social development) 
the meaning is clear. When used without qualification, it is generally referring to 
                                            
13  Michael Barnett, "Nation Building's New Face," Foreign Policy, Nov-Dec 2002, 98. 
14  Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory" In Nation-
Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2006), 3. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Miller, States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace, 
71-72 
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economic growth, or economic progress. There is, of course, a gap between the 
two terms. Since 1945, there are obvious cases where the U.S., presided over 
successful reconstruction: Japan and Germany after World War II being the 
classic examples.17 The reason for success in one, but not in the other, is that in 
reconstruction there already exists political and social infrastructure to some 
degree. The solution set is a matter of introducing capital and/or resources.18 
Development is a more complex challenge insofar as, at the outset, there is little 
or no ‘modern’ infrastructure an external actor will by necessity need to build the 
capacity for the state. Further complicating this is the fact that when one comes 
to the matter of social, cultural, or political and even to a lesser extent, economic, 
development, things can get somewhat, complicated 
Finally, it is of use to consider the delineation between state and nation, as 
well as setting out a definition of the nation-state. The state is the institution that 
maintains a monopoly on the use of coercive force within a society. There is of 
course, behind this definition, the Hobbesian notion of the social contract by 
which the populace divests the right to violence willingly. They give this to the 
state with the spoken (constitution) or unspoken (social convention) 
understanding that the state will act on behalf of the interests of the population 
within its territory.19 This means that the state, as an agent for the people, 
sanctioned to commit and retain the use of violence, must organize along 
institutional lines that facilitate some degree of efficiency. Following Max Weber, 
Jeff Goodwin offers an excellent definition of the state when he notes that it 
consists of, “those core administrative, policing, and military organizations, more 
or less coordinated by an executive authority, that extract resources from and 
administer and rule (through violence if necessary) a territorially defined national 
                                            
17 Fukuyama, Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory, 5. 
18 As suggested in Dobbins, America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq. 
19 I use ‘state’ here to cover monarchy, democracy and dictatorship.  
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society”.20 As Anthony Smith reminds us, in relation to V. I. Lenin’s observation 
almost a hundred years ago, at its most fundamental, the state is “the standing 
army, police, and officialdom.”21 
The nation differs from the state in that while the state refers to the 
institutions of government, the nation refers to the people who comprise the 
nation. Joseph Stalin, in his study of the national question, argued that a ‘nation’ 
was “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis 
of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifest in a common culture.”22 This definition touches all the significant factors, 
such as, common language, common culture, and a common history. 
Nationalism and nation making then, is a process whereby people seek to define 
who they are in terms of a national identity.23  
So, what does the amalgamation of the two look like? The relative 
coherence of a nation-state lies in the length of the hyphen between the two.24 
The most common use of a hyphen is to indicate how two words are combined to 
produce a distinct meaning. This is to say that the words that are joined by the 
hyphen build off each other, thereby providing us with a distinct term. Working 
back, the longer the hyphen, the weaker the combined meaning. Turning to 
define a nation-state, it is precisely the temporal proximity of the two words that 
provide the strongest definition. Or, put another way, it is only in those instances 
where nation and state are virtually inseparable that the entity concerned can 
                                            
20 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 12. 
21  Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism" In Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 11. 
22  Cited in Mark T. Berger and Devleena Ghosh, "Geopolitics and the Cold War 
Developmental State in Asia: The Culture of National Development and the Development of 
National Culture in Independent India, 1947-2007," Geopolitics 14, no. 1 (2009 (Forthcoming), 1. 
23  Vera Tolz, "Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist 
Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 6 (1998), 993. 
24 This comment is attributed to Dr. Marcos Berger, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, 2007. 
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truly be called a modern nation-state. For example, Cynthia Enloe and Mostata 
Rejai, in their article “Nation-States and State-Nations”, argue that, “a major 
variable distinguishing one pattern of nationalism from another has been the 
interplay between ‘nation’ and ‘state.’” This is ultimately “a relationship between 
national identity and political autonomy, between national integration and political 
sovereignty.”25 This delineation between the nation and the state is extremely 
helpful in that it highlights the two key aspects of the nation-state. This 
delineation points to the idea that the, "state, in other words, is primarily a 
political-legal concept, whereas nation is primarily psycho-cultural [italics added].” 
Therefore, states may exist when there is no nation (one thinks of the present 
situation in Iraq). Conversely, a nation may exist where no state does (such as 
Palestine). It is only, “when the two coincide, when the boundaries of the state 
are approximately coterminous with those of the nation,” that the resulting 
conglomeration may be called rightly, a nation-state and is recognized as such 
by other nation-states and the United Nations (UN). A nation-state is a nation and 
state, “[which] possesses political sovereignty. [And] it is socially cohesive as well 
as politically organized and independent.”26 
An even more important aspect of defining the nation-state is the 
emphasis on nationalism or the spirit of the nation. “At the most general level, 
nationalism refers to an awareness of membership in a nation (potential or 
actual), together with a desire to achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the identity, 
integrity, and prosperity of that nation.”27 The nation-state is thus a complex 
amalgamation of a shared identity and the effective fit of the nation and the state. 
It identifies itself in terms of one specific ‘nation’ where individuals are 
horizontally bonded citizens. This creates an ‘identity of character’ where the 
                                            
25  Cynthia H. Enloe and Mostafa Rejai, "Nation-States and State-Nations," International 
Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Jun., 1969), 140-158, http://links.jstor.org, 140. 
26  Ibid., 143. 
27  Ibid., 141. 
 11
state is congruent with the nation.28 Ernest Gellner speaks to this when he says 
that, “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent.”29 The nation-state then is the ideal 
form of a political organization, when the political boundaries (the state) are 
congruent with the ethnographic or linguistic frontiers (nation).30 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will first consider the theory and practice of state building. The 
discussion will be set within the historical context of decolonization and the Cold 
War, before turning to more contemporary concerns about state building. The 
reason for starting at this point is that while nationalism can be traced to the 
emergence of the enlightenment in Europe, the beginnings of the nation-state 
system as it is known today begins with the establishment of the United Nations 
(UN) after 1945.31 Moreover, it is through the UN that the nation-state became 
the unit of analysis for geopolitics and international relations down to the present. 
Through this investigation of the theory and practice of state building it will be 
shown how state building in the post 1945 era through the end of the Cold War 
has increasingly delinked the people from the state, or put another way, how 
state building projects have increasingly weakened the connection between the 
nation and the state. 
                                            
28  Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism 
(Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 3. 
29  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
30  Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958), 17. 
31 Anderson describes the emergence of nationalism as the result of the dissipation of the 
dynastic and cosmological hold upon humanity beginning during the enlightenment. However, 
there are others, notably Adrian Hastings and Anthony Smith who trace the rise of nationalism 
much further back in time. This is a type of proto-nationalism or ethno-nationalism grounded in 
ethnic causality as opposed to the historical conjuncture outlined by Anderson. See Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 12-19; Hastings, 
The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism; and Anthony D. Smith, 
National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991). 
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Second, this thesis will offer a solution to this problem. In particular, this 
thesis argues that nationalism is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
successful nation-state development. This will include examining nationalism via 
reference to the primordial or ethnocentric and modernist schools of 
nationalism.32 Building on this discussion, this thesis will outline a model for 
understanding nationalism in relation to nation building and/or state building. This 
model, the Nation-State Congruence Model, argues that there is a dynamic at 
work wherein the health of a nation-state is dependent on the congruence 
between the nation as an imagined community and the state as a capable and 
limited entity.33 The assertion becomes then, that as the nation has become 
increasingly delinked from the state, the proper understanding of state or nation 
building is to reemphasize the construction of a national consciousness or 
national identity through its proper vehicle, that of nationalism understood rightly. 
Finally, this thesis will turn to current state building practices of the post 
1975 era focusing on the ineffectual policies that have driven the state building 
project to the brink of ruin. This thesis argues that the current solution set, which 
as the Nation-State Congruence Model predicts, is woefully inadequate for 
successful state building. This is due in part to the focus by recent efforts on the 
construction of bureaucratic edifices to the detriment of a realized and inclusive  
 
 
                                            
32 There is a subset of the nationalism debate that terms the modernist approach as the 
“civic” approach. The emphasis in the civic nationalism is on liberal “inclusiveness” wherein, 
“elites are not threatened by democratization, and when representative and journalistic 
institutions are already well established before the mass of the population gains political power.” 
This is not in opposition to the modernist school, but is instead a subcategory of it in that the 
principles of civic nationalism rise out of increasing modernization. See Jack Snyder, From Voting 
to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2000), 38-39. 
33 This model is built upon the work of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict 
Anderson who argue that the state = nation = people. Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism; Miller, States, Nations, and the Great 
Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; and 
specifically E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 19. 
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national identity. In response to the inadequacies of the current practices, this 
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II. SEEKING THE MODERN STATE I: THE RISE OF THE 
STATE IN THE POST 1945 WORLD 
The great and chief end, therefore of men uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the 
preservation of their property.34 –John Locke 
A. INTRODUCTION: THE HEART OF THE MATTER 
The greatest of human endeavors is the consolidation of powers within 
one body, for all bodies, for the protection of life and liberty for the betterment of 
all. It is to this end that societies have organized throughout history and moreover 
it will continue to be the purpose for which societies will continue to organize. 
Even in this new age of globalization, the fundamental question of security for the 
preservation of property must have an answer. For this very reason, the state 
building project is ultimately about the construction of an organization that will 
guarantee the preservation of these values. The question then, when reflecting 
on the history of state building over the past sixty years, is to what degree the 
sundry modes of action have achieved the movement of personal sovereignty 
into a body politick that delivers the unspoken agreed upon guarantee of 
preservation of property.  
This agreement, considered the foundational social contract, has been 
implemented in a way that means various things to different people, yet the basic 
formula is unchanged; people demand from their government the protection of 
their persons, property, and their way of life. All people want a roof over their 
head, food on the table, and the possibility of advancement or betterment of their 
situation. This leads to the question of this chapter: what are the characteristics 
of a modern state and have the various state building projects in the post 1945 
era met these conditions?  
                                            
34  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: Hafner Publishing Co, 1965, 
originally published in 1680), 184.  
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Samuel Huntington helps frame this question by stating that, “the most 
important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of 
government, but their degree of government.”35 The heart of the matter 
concerning the success and failure of the modern state is, as Huntington notes, 
less about how one governs - social, democratic, communist, and autocratic – 
and revolves instead on how well one governs. The degree of efficacy is whether 
one provides security and development for their citizens, not whether their 
bureaucratic agencies are properly aligned and established. This distinction 
places the emphasis on that one governs instead of how one governs. 
This is the same argument that Douglas Borer and Mark Berger make in 
“All Roads Lead to and from Iraq: the Long War and the transformation of the 
nation-state system”. They argue that the Cold War was less a “contest over the 
basic structure of the nation-state system,” and more of a struggle about “how 
the people of each nation-state would choose their leaders and organize their 
national societies.”36 The Cold War was a global struggle between Washington 
and Moscow, but a deeper and significant battle was also taking plaice within the 
societies themselves. Could state-socialism deliver goods and services to their 
citizens to the same degree that the democratic capitalist model provided for 
theirs? In one sense then, it was not a struggle against the ‘other’, but rather a 
struggle with the ‘self’.37 
This chapter will discuss sovereignty and legitimacy, and the nature of the 
social contract as it relates to the nation-state. Then it will consider the rise of 
development economics and the shift in state building theory in the early 1970s 
due in part to the effects of the Vietnam War and the apparent failure of state-
                                            
35  Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006), 1. 
36  Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer, "All Roads Lead to and from Iraq: The Long War 
and the Transformation of the Nation-State System," Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 460. 
37 Borer and Berger go on to suggest that the ‘Long War’ is less about the ‘West’ versus 
Islam and more about the struggle within Islam between modernists and violent neo-
traditionalists. Ibid., 461. 
 17
driven development projects. The purpose here is to explain the dynamics that 
are in play, as one approaches the state building project, so that it is possible to 
design a better solution set for future state building projects. 
B. SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMACY IN POLITICAL ORDER 
Sovereignty is distinct from legitimacy. The former is a formal, de jure 
recognition of one sovereign nation-state by another and since 1945 includes 
membership in the UN. Legitimacy on the other hand is the de facto degree of 
support a government or state has from within its territory and from without. A 
state can be sovereign and devoid of legitimacy. The degree of legitimacy is 
dependent on its citizens. Thus, state building (where the state in question is 
already sovereign and all state building projects focus on sovereign states) is 
about building legitimacy. Legitimacy flows from the fulfillment of the social 
contract where the state delivers goods and services to its citizens.38 Ashraf 
Ghani and Clare Lockhart aptly note that there is a consensus now emerging that 
“sovereign” states are those, “that actually perform the functions that make them 
sovereign”.39 That is, sovereignty and legitimacy can converge and ideally, a 
sovereign nation-state should be a legitimate nation-state. Whether it is or not, is 
the challenge of the modern state building project and is prerequisite for the 
construction of a state.  
As previously defined, the state is the rightful employer of violence.40 
However, if we stop with a vulgar reading of Max Weber, where the monopoly of 
violence in the hands of a sovereign state defines the state, we deny a more 
penetrating truth. Elsewhere, Weber articulates a more functional view where the 
states’ basic institutions − the legislature, the police, the judiciary, and the civil 
                                            
38 I define legitimacy as a form of trust in that what a state is receiving is a vote of confidence 
in its ability to deliver goods and services and that translates into loyalty and the meeting of 
obligations, such as payment of taxes or service in the armed forces. 
39  Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, 
4. 
40  As discussed in Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 12. 
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military administrations − become the mechanisms to consolidate, organize, 
administer and maintain the use of violence.41 Thus, it is that the state is 
composed of those institutions that maintain the capacity for coercive force, both 
over their own populations as well as the external threats. The state is more than 
the legal author of violence; it is instead the organism that is responsible for 
protecting the populace from not only the external threat, but the internal as well. 
The state then becomes Leviathan, an entity that exists over and for, yet subject 
to, the people it governs.42  
We must not overlook the issue of the states’ exclusive monopoly of 
violence. It is through this function that goods and services can be delivered, thus 
fulfilling the social contract. Take, for example, an academic institution where the 
overarching responsibility on the part of the institution is to produce educated 
individuals who are better educated than they were before they attended. With 
the goal of assisting or providing for the proper management of student’s the 
institution must maintain the right to exercise discipline over the student. More 
closely though, when a student attends an institution, they are in one sense 
surrendering the right to do whatever they desire – they cannot skip classes or 
fail to turn in assignments. If they do so, the institution has the right to do 
violence to them, such things as suspension or expulsion. The necessity is 
grounded in the need to maintain order within the institution so that it can 
properly educate an individual. It is precisely because the institution maintains 
the right of and the capacity for violence that goods and services can be 
delivered.  
As such, this idea of the state rests on two linked, but mutually exclusive, 
concepts that the repository of state power is in either a person or a group. 
Niccoló Machiavelli said that, “all states and dominions which hold or have held 
                                            
41  Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, 
117. 
42 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2004, Originally Published in 1651), 
108. 
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sway over mankind are either republics or monarchies.”43 What he is indicating is 
that power is a zero sum game whereby one actor imposes their will on another. 
His second suggestion is what we today understand as the republican or 
democratic model, which is more in line with the thinking of John Locke, who was 
influential in the development of the idea of the modern democratic state. The 
idea of the republic is one where power arises from the coming together of a 
group in cooperation of achieving a common goal, a view derivative of Hobbes’s 
view of the state as an independent, omnipotent, god-like entity empowered by a 
social contract.44 In this way, the two repositories of sovereign power within a 
state are 1) the rule of the elite, whether it is a person or family, and 2) the rule of 
a bureaucracy, nominally elected, republican in nature. The distinction is 
necessary for a proper understanding of the source of legitimacy for the state. In 
the former, legitimacy is something taken, or if not taken, it is at least held. 
Conversely, the latter suggest that the source of legitimacy is bound inseparably 
to the will of the people (or as Kant has criticized, to the tyranny of the masses.)  
It is precisely the active abdication of personal sovereignty to a state that 
forms the foundation for the modern state. John Locke said that, “every man, by 
consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts 
himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the 
determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it.”45 This is the concept of 
the republic at its most basic level and a proper understanding of this directly 
impacts the functionality of the state. In a very real sense, the state must 
recognize the inherent responsibility for its citizens to provide protection for an 
individual’s property (lives, liberties, and estates).46  
                                            
43  Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci (New York: New American Library, 
1999), 33. 
44  Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, 
117. 
45  Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 169. 
46  Ibid., 184. 
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To recapitulate, the state is defined here as the sovereign modality for the 
use of force. To perform this function, the state is composed of institutions with 
the capacity for the execution of this function. There are two overarching forms 
that the state can take, the first being a monarchy and the second a republic. 
While the former was the standard for the majority of human history, the latter is 
now in the de jure majority worldwide. Due to this arrangement there exists a 
social contract between the state and the citizen, even in those extant 
constitutional monarchies (such as Britain and Thailand), while Saudi Arabia and 
Brunei are the exceptions that prove the rule. It is widely accepted that the state 
is responsible for providing goods and services to its citizens.47 The debate is 
about the extent and type of goods and services, the method of delivery and the 
obligations that go with them. With this in mind, it is now possible to begin to 
describe this dynamic. 
Aldous Huxley in, A Brave New World, captures the tension inherent in the 
role of the state and the function it serves, namely, the meeting of the 
expectations of its citizens. The character called the Controller, when asked why 
the population cannot have a copy of Othello, remarks that, “Our world is not the 
same as Othello’s world. You can’t make flivvers without steal – and you can’t 
make tragedies without social instability. The world’s stable now. People are 
happy; they get what they want, and they never want what they can’t get.”48 The 
implication is that for a sovereign government to achieve legitimacy it must meet 
the needs and desires of its citizens. Conversely, an imbalance between desires 
and their receipt will lead social decline and collapse. This dynamic is described 
in the legitimacy model below (Figure 1). 
                                            
47  Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, 
21. 
48  Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), 220. 
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Figure 1.   The State Function-Legitimacy Dynamic49 
In this model, the state and the society are shown as existing in a dynamic 
relationship wherein each is dependent upon the other. As previously argued, a 
state is necessary for the provision of social order due to the nature of this world. 
As such, the state is obligated to provide goods and services through state 
functions.50 To the degree that the state is capable and, in actuality performs, 
these basic functions, the citizens will return legitimacy to the state thereby 
increasing the capacity of the state for delivery of goods and services. This  
 
                                            
49 Adapted from Gordon McCormick, “A Systems Perspective on Insurgency,” Lecture #3 
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2007); and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd Edition 
ed. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), 58. 
50 State Functions are those things that a state must due to fulfill the aspirations of the 
citizens for inclusion in the political process. Examples would be the rule of law, the establishment 
of a market, and the provision of a secure environment. For a comprehensive list see Ghani and 
Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, 124-166. 
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legitimacy is a form of social capital (or degree of trust) where the citizens’ belief 
in the state’s capacity for provision of goods and services begins a mutually 
reinforcing synergistic effect.  
This is the greatest failing of states in the post 1945 era. They are 
sovereign in the sense that they are incorporated; yet they fail to deliver even the 
most basic goods and services. Therefore, they do not carry any semblance of 
legitimacy. This creates a sovereignty gap between the state and the society, 
wherein the sovereignty is in a sense wrested from the citizen in that the cycle of 
delivery of goods for legitimacy is broken. The government then becomes 
illegitimate. It is striking then, that the shared perception among the intelligentsia 
is that the nation-states of this world remain sovereign, “regardless of their 
performance in practice – and the de facto reality that many are malfunctioning or 
collapsed states, incapable of providing their citizens with even the most basic 
services, and where the reciprocal sets of rights and obligations are not a 
reality.”51 What is it that constitutes a modern state? What is the measure of 
success? A modern state is one in which the state performs state functions for its 
population. A successful state is one that has bridged the ‘sovereignty gap’. A 
sovereign state is one that actually performs the functions that makes it 
legitimate, and make it sovereign in a de jure and a de facto form.52 Having laid 
down the relationship between state and citizen the next section will consider 
state building in historical context.  
C. STATE BUILDING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE RISE OF 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND THE FAILURE OF SOUTH 
VIETNAM: STATE BUILDING IN THE POST 1945 ERA 
The basic challenge in state building has been a lack of agreement on 
what states should and should not do and how best it should carry out its various 
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functions once there is agreement as to what they are.53 This section will first 
discuss the rise of development economics out of the Second World War and 
then it will outline the change in economic policy and the rise of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) resultant of the impact of the Vietnam War.  
The world after 1945 was a markedly different one than what existed prior 
to World War II. The significant change, among many, was seen in the decline of 
colonial power and the rise of the nation-state as the vehicle for modernity as 
codified in the United Nations.54 The belief and enthusiasm for state-led 
development in the late 1940s through the end of the Vietnam War is grounded 
theoretically in Modernization Theory. This theory suggests that a ‘modern’ 
society is one in which its people are literate, urban dwelling, and more affluent 
financially. This notion deeply influenced the work of the economists of the era 
such as, Rostow, Kuznets, Cherery, and Taylor, who came to emphasize the 
importance of structural change as it relates to the rise of per capita income, the 
decline of agrarian society, and the rise of industry.55 David Epstein, et al, in their 
article “Democratic Transitions” argue persuasivly that Modernization Theory 
consitutes a genuine relevence to the linkage between Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and democratic regime stability. Modernization Theory argues, that as 
societies develop economically they will be less tolerant of oppressive political 
regimes.56 
Of particular note, Walt Whitman Rostow was especially influential in the 
formation of Modernization Theory and the subsequent establishment of this 
theory in the framework of the U.S. forgein policy. Rostow’s most famous 
contribution to the field was his theory regarding the stages of economic growth. 
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Rostow first postulated this theory as an opposition to the Marxist view where the 
world would necessarily move towards communism. At this time, in the early 
1950s, there was a definite fear on behalf of the U.S. government that the 
increasing poverty in many of the newly formed nation-states would provide a 
ground in which the communist rhetoric would find root. With this consideration, 
Rostow, along with the likes of C.I.A. chief, Allen Dulles, sought to codify an 
American alternative to the socialist agenda. This was the beginning of 
Modernization Theory. The real signifigance of this model though, is seen in the 
effect it had on American policy makers of the early 1950s. Rostow’s theory 
offered an appealing analytical tool for the post colonial world because all nations 
were merely at different stages of economic growth.57 Moreover, the way 
forward, since the path is linear, is paved by bringing “developed” and “modern” 
societies into contact with “traditional” ones. Thus, the, “lessons of America’s 
past demonstrated the route to genuine modernity… the United States could 
drive stagnant societies through the transtion process.”58 This, of course, offered 
hope to democratic countries in the wake of the growing communist threat. 
Additionaly, this theory was compounded by the fact that the successes of the 
German and Japanese military occupations seemed contingent on the 
transformation of their industry, economy, and societiy via the state-centered 
model. These successes only served to reinforce the developmental model 
created by Rostow. 
This theoretical base directly led to the explosion of the nation-state 
system and the subsequent undertaking of state building projects. Many of these 
projects were, in the early years, riding upon the zeal of the American 
modernization model and development economics. Much of this confidence was 
based in the experiences of the American “New Deal” projects of the 1930’s – 
                                            
57  Mark H. Haetele, "Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth" In Staging Growth: 
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such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the rapid industrialization, 
modernization, and urbanization associated with the American industrial 
complex. This excitement, coupled with the onset of the Cold War and the 
communist “scare” led to a great deal of enthusiasm for state-led development 
projects such as major infrastructure improvements.59 One such enthusiast, 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., even went so far as to declare that the economic and 
social reforms encapsulated in the New Deal were a “weapon” with which the 
United States could outbid all communists for the support of the people of Asia.60 
This desire to “outbid” the communists is readily seen the in U.S. involvement in 
state building in Vietnam (French-Indochina).  
In the early 1950’s the U.S. faced a difficult policy decision, whether to 
support French Colonial policy, or seek to break from “old-fashioned colonial 
attitudes” with regards to the challenges in Vietnam. On the one hand, France 
was necessary in the defense of Vietnam and the containment of the Soviet 
threat in Southeast Asia. On the other, the U.S. did not want to work against 
France and end up involving itself more than necessary. This hedging led to a 
development strategy where the U.S. sought to deal directly with the Vietnamese 
government by providing around $50 million for various projects between 1950-
1952. However, the U.S. hopes of spending their way to success did not lead to 
the desired end state as the country increasingly descended into the First 
Indochinese war.61 
The Geneva Accords of 1954, brought about by the cessation of hostilities 
between the French and the Vietminh, began a process that would bring the U.S. 
even deeper into the development process of now South Vietnam, and ultimately 
into a full scale conflict as the policies failed. Between 1955 and 1961, the U.S. 
poured over $1 billion in economic and military aid into South Vietnam. This 
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staggering number placed the tiny nation of Vietnam as the fifth leading recipient 
of U.S. aid during this time period. Moreover, by the late 1950s there were 
roughly 1500 U.S. citizens working in southern Vietnam, assisting the 
government in various ways, and making the U.S. mission in Saigon the largest 
in the world.62 
Another example of the state-centric aid policy in South Vietnam during 
this time period is seen in the economic-import program. Under this program 
Vietnamese importers ordered export goods from foreign firms, while Washington 
paid the bill. Then, when the goods arrived, the Vietnamese importers paid into a 
common fund in the national bank. This fund was then used to cover operating 
expenses for the Vietnamese government as well as building project throughout 
the country.63 This program demonstrates a focus on centralizing an economy 
through the civil government. The point of emphasis is on seeking to build the 
state institutions through direct involvement. This reliance on importing foreign 
goods, through the use of a state-centered program is one of the foundational 
tenants of modernization theory of this time. Still, the failure of Modernization 
theory, as seen in the slide to war in Vietnam, had lasting impacts on politicians 
as they sought to link development and security in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Samuel Huntington perhaps best codified the theoretical crisis of nation 
building in the late 1960s in his work, Political Order in Changing Societies. As 
mentioned at the outset, he postulated that the key measure of a government 
was the degree to which it governed. Subsequently, he questioned whether the 
efforts of development economics over the previous twenty years had brought 
about the changed world promised with the establishment of the United Nations. 
He argued that the central issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the, 
“apparently remorseless tendency for the economic gap to broaden [between 
developed and undeveloped countries].” He also noted that there was a similar 
gap emerging in the political realm, between highly developed political systems 
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and underdeveloped political systems. This led him to the central argument of his 
book: political instability is a function of, “rapid mobilization of new groups into 
politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.”64  
When this took place, the challenge increasingly became the way that 
political instability undermined traditional sources of state authority by creating 
new associations that were unable to effectively “associate together.”65 The 
situation is one where the rates of growth in social mobilization and political 
participation are high, and the rates of growth in political organization and 
institutionalization are low.66 The result is that there is a lag in “appropriate” 
political participation or political inclusion. More broadly, the critique is that it was 
a waste of the previous twenty years to focus on the development of national 
economies at the expense of political infrastructure. In effect, by not considering 
that political inclusion was vital to the stability and potential for growth, the state 
building project of developmental economics had brought about a situation where 
the state was unable to meet the demands of its citizens. This theoretical 
framework laid the foundation for the new direction that state building took in the 
early 1970s under the administration of Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974). 
Under Nixon, two things happened that changed not only state building, 
but also the political economy of the world order more generally, ushering in the 
early vestiges of the globalization project. These changes included the shift in 
economic policy away from fixed exchange rates, the end of the gold standard, 
the deregulation of the financial section and the transition from state-sponsored 
to private economic development through the open market. The Vietnam War 
                                            
64  Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1-3. 
65 I define political instability by the negative consequences it has on the state building 
project. Political instability inhibits state building in that there is not a ‘secure’ environment where 
legitimate political processes can take place. Huntington grounds his assessment in the rise of 
insurgencies, revolts, and wars in the period between 1958 and 1965. There is a rise of over 
twenty conflicts per year. Thus, the question of whether developmental economics as a model for 
state growth is appropriate. Ibid., 4. 
66  Ibid., 5. 
 28
served as a watershed event in the realm of state building.67 In The Battle for 
Asia, Mark Berger argues that the rise of the US-led globalization project, and the 
transformation of the nation-state system, was part of the growing diffusion of 
neo-liberalism and the prominence of neo-classical economics in the last two 
decades of the Cold War. By the 1980s, specifically, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank increasingly advised governments around the 
world that the underdevelopment they were experiencing was the result of 
excessive state intervention in the economy.68 Essentially, it was a move away 
from Development Economics to Neo-Classical Economics. There were profound 
implications for state sovereignty, starting with Nixon taking the US dollar off the 
gold standard and the subsequent rolling back over the 1970s and 1980s of fixed 
exchange rates.69  
The impact of this move by Nixon is sovereignty moved out of the hands 
of the government and into the hands of private banks and financial institutions in 
particular. Berger notes four results from Nixon’s actions: 
1. They insured that private banks (particularly US-based banks) 
began to play a much greater role in global finance. 
2. Government supervision of global financial organizations was 
dramatically weakened. 
3. Currency exchange rates and financial systems of other nation-
states, particularly in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were 
increasingly influenced by trends in the financial markets of the 
United States.  
4. Growing competition within the banking systems of the various 
countries in the OECD was encouraged, while the government of 
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the US was increasingly able to more or less determine the 
regulatory framework for global financial markets.70 
This shift is a radical departure from the classic state legitimacy model (Figure 1). 
The onset of globalization resulted in the state losing the positive social capital 
feedback in increasing measure to the global market (Figure 2). For the state, 
this represented a negative return on its investment and necessarily decreased 
its capacity to provide basic state functions. While Figure 1 represented a 
synergistic “virtuous” cycle that was mutually reinforcing, Figure 2 represents a 
debilitating cycle with negative consequences. 
 
Figure 2.   Delinking of the Dollar and the Loss of State Legitimacy 
A second result of the Vietnam War was a shift in U.S. aid policy. USAID 
was heavily involved in the war in Vietnam. This involvement solidified Nixon’s 
decision that the U.S. “cannot – and will not – conceive all the plans, design all 
the programs, execute all the decisions, and undertake all the defense of the free 
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nations of the world.”71 This new policy was a result of the challenges that USAID 
faced in Vietnam, the least of which was the challenge of trying to engage in 
‘development’ in a war zone.72 The failings of USAID (though arguably not 
entirely their fault) led congress to vote down the president’s request for more aid 
in 1971, a first in American foreign policy and indicative of the new direction.73  
James Grant and other individuals saw state-led development in crisis and 
began arguing for a change to U.S. policy regarding state building. They 
awakened the smoldering suspicion on state-led projects that often were broadly 
conceived and widely implemented technological and infrastructure projects. In 
fact, it was due to Grant and others that led to the “New Direction” policies in 
1973. One of the outcomes of this was seen in the reduction of USAID worldwide 
staff form 18,030 to 8,489.74 (The effects of this are still being felt today in the 
understaffing of the State Department and their subsequent establishment of the 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in 2004.75) The 
U.S., among other donors, had their conceptual framework, derived from 
developmental economics tested during the Vietnam War. As Washington’s effort 
to create a stable and independent sovereign nation-state of South Vietnam 
figuratively and literally went up in flames new models of development filled the 
gap, regardless of whether development economics was the cause of failure in 
Southeast Asia. 
With the retreat from state-led development in the 1970s, there was a rise 
by the 1980s in the number and type of NGOs. Backed by the United Nations 
and the World Bank, NGOs saw a rise in popularity, primarily in that they were 
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not “the state”.76 While previously, NGOs had been auxiliaries to the 
development project, they now emerged as the decision makers and policy 
developers for state building projects. Coincidently, the World Bank under Robert 
McNamara saw its loan portfolio increase from $800 million to over $12 billion 
from 1968 to 1981.77 This is a clear indication of the increased role of 
international organizations as the influence of the state development economic 
model waned. 
In this way, the rise of the market and international aid community vis-à-
vis the state-led development economic model further separated the state from 
the society. As Ghani and Lockhart note, ceding state functions to an outside 
agency results in the severance of the critical link of accountability between the 
state and its citizens.78 Figure 3 represents this changed dynamic that was a 
result of the Vietnam War.  
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Figure 3.   The Impact of the International Aid in the Vietnam Era 
The market and International aid have superseded the state as the 
provider of goods and services. 79 Thus, it is that the state is no longer receiving 
the legitimacy, which the social contract indicates it ought to receive. The state 
then becomes increasingly irrelevant and unable to control society within its 
formal territorial boundaries.  There is cessation of return on investment for the 
state because the nation no longer “trusts” or deems the state worthy of social 
capital. Thus, at this point, the nation-state is effectively failing. The social 
contract has been broken, the nation no longer validates the existence of the 
state. Figure 3 represents not only the global order after Nixon, but describes the  
breakdown of the nation-state. The Vietnam War and the change in economic 
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theory and aid policy that came in its wake radically reshaped the traditional 
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III. THE NECESSITY OF NATIONALISM 
Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of 
consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become 
more and more common to mankind. The mental life of man is as 
much dominated by an ego-consciousness as it is by a group-
consciousness. Both are complex states of mind at which we arrive 
through experiences of differentiation and opposition, of the ego 
and the surrounding world, of the we-group and those outside the 
group… this group consciousness will strive towards creating 
homogeneity within the group, a conformity and like-mindedness 
which will lead to and facilitate concerted common action.80   
        – Hans Kohn 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The argument so far has centered on the rise and decline of the nation-
state between the 1940s and the 1980s. The changing patterns of globalization, 
and the inability on the part of many nation-states and the international 
community to integrate the state into the new order, has fundamentally altered 
the relationship between the state and the nation. The challenge then, for the 
state building project, is to re-link the nation and the state. Nationalism is the 
most expedient, and perhaps the only way contemporary, and future, state 
building projects can succeed. The state’s effectiveness relates directly to the 
degree that the nation is in alignment with the state. Seth Kaplan noted that, “a 
country’s ability to advance is crucially tied to its citizens’ ability to cooperate – 
both among themselves and in partnership with the state.”81  In essence, the 
more homogenous the society, the easier it is to interact, or the lower the 
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transaction costs.82 Thus, the degree of nation-ness that exists in a nation-state 
is central to state strength and capacity for state-development and stability 
because it allows and facilitates “concerted common action.”83  
This chapter argues for the necessity of nationalism in the practice of state 
building and, in so doing, demonstrates that the goal ought not to be just state 
building, but nation making. This chapter will begin by considering competing 
theories of nationalism. It will then offer a definition of nationalism that considers 
the relationship of the nation to the state and what it is that nationalism actually 
does. Finally, this chapter will describe the Nation-State Congruence Model as a 
way of explaining the dynamic between the nation and state and thereby 
demonstrate the role that nationalism plays, or should play in state building.  
B. COMPETING THEORIES OF NATIONALISM 
The first goal in understanding nationalism’s role in state building is to 
describe it as a noun, that is to say, what it is. This, of course, presents a 
challenge immediately in that nationalism is not a unified school of thought. 
There are two distinct approaches to this subject: ethno-nationalism and 
modernism.84 The former school is founded on sociological or ethnic nationalism, 
                                            
82 I use the term homogenous liberally here, meaning homogeny in the inclusive sense as 
opposed to a more limited view of homogeny centered on identifiers such as race, religion, or 
locality. In the liberal sense homogeny, as I refer to it here, is more in line with Gellner who says 
that nationalism is, “the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually 
substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in 
place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced 
locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.” Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 
57. 
83 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 10-11. 
84 Some writers argue that there is a third school of nationalism. They do this by dividing 
what I consider “ethno-nationalism” into ethnocentric and primordial (and perhaps a further 
variance in religious nationalism). Jack Eller considers nationalism as the link between the Ethnic 
group and the macro group, such as the Umma or Christendom. Indicating a pre-existence of the 
idea of the nationalism and that it is bound up in blood, kinship, or religious ideology. However, I 
feel that definitions based on ethnie, religion, and primordial givens fall into the amorphous term 
“culture” and are therefore better considered together. Jack D. Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to 
Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1999), 20-21. 
 37
as argued by the likes of Anthony Smith and John Hutchison. This school has 
also been called the ‘primordialist’ approach due to the belief that a pre-existent 
nation or national identity is foundational to the idea of the nation-state.85 The 
argument is that there are cultural givens, such as blood, language, race, and 
religion that funnel in to the ‘essence’ of the nation.86 These givens are the things 
that to one degree or another are transcendent to a given people and are in a 
sense inherited, not constructed. Nationalism then is a cultural phenomenon.87 
Anthony Smith says in his work, National Identity, that central to the myth of 
nationalism is, “the idea that nations exist from time immemorial, and that 
nationalists must reawaken them from a long slumber to take their place in a 
world of nations.”88 To Smith, an ethnic community is, “a named human 
population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and common 
cultural elements, a link with historic territory, and a measure of solidarity.”89 To 
the primordialist, a nation is a community of shared values, traditions, and history 
that have, “evolve[d] out of an unplanned historical-evolutionary process.”90 
Montserrat Guibernau offers an excellent criticism of the ethnocentric 
approach to understanding the origins of nationalism. Simply put, her argument is 
that by assuming cultural givens, one ignores the fact that ‘culture’ is dynamic 
and ever changing. Things such as religion and language are not static and often 
change over time.91 A great example of this is the case of the Protestant 
Reformation and the change, not only religiously that it brought in the Catholic 
Church, but the widespread social and civic changes that it brought about in 
Europe, many of which are still resonating throughout the world today. Vinjayedra 
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Rao and Michael Walton point out that culture, “is not a set of primordial 
phenomena permanently embedded within national or religious or other groups, 
but rather a set of constituted attributes, constantly in flux, both shaping and 
being shaped by social and economic aspects of human interaction.”92 
The second school belongs to the modernist approach as championed by 
scholars such as Kohn, Hobsbawm, Gellner, Breuilly, and Anderson. Generally, 
in the modernist approach, nationalism is seen as the vehicle for modernity. 
Correspondingly, this line of thought places nationalism, as a recent 
phenomenon that occurs only as a result of the industrial revolution and, in one 
sense, is dependent upon modernization.93 Hobsbawm says that, “the basic 
characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its 
modernity.”94 He goes on to say that even the entomology of the word nation is 
of recent invention. This view stands in opposition to others who maintain that 
there is a degree of ‘naturalness’ in the nation in the sense that it has already 
existed. Modernists view the nation-state as something that is not a naturally 
occurring phenomenon. It is not a natural ‘sociopolitical’ form, nor does it arise 
out of pre-existing human norms.95 However, some modernists will argue that 
nationalism has arisen out of a conflux of cultural norms, whether the forces of 
the Enlightenment as Anderson argues,96 or as a result of the forces of 
industrialization and the natural progression as humanity has moved from an 
agrarian age into an industrial one.97 Still, in both cases nationalism is 
inextricably linked to the changing global order of the modern era. It is then, to 
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the modernist that, “nationalism is not older than the second half of the 
eighteenth century.”98 Nationalism arose in the vortex of political, economic, and 
intellectual developments that had been building for some time and it could not 
have developed apart form the notion of popular sovereignty and nationalism is 
the process by which the people are integrated into a common political form.99 
The modernist view places the origins of nationalism in the age of 
Enlightenment when men began to apply systematic thinking in all areas of the 
human experience. During the enlightenment there was a swelling in the 
reinterpretation of the state, man, and the society that brought out, “the dusk of 
religious modes of thought. The century of the Enlightenment, of rationalist 
secularism… With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part 
composed did not disappear… What then was required was a secular 
transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning… few things 
were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation.”100  
The human desire for purpose and meaning sought out new vessels as 
the old were put down. As the religious and dynastic reasons for living faded with 
the dawning of the Enlightenment, nationalism became an obvious outcropping. 
Anderson notes that:  
The slow, uneven decline of these interlinked certainties, first in 
Western Europe, later elsewhere, under the impact of economic 
change, ‘discoveries’ (social and scientific), and the development of 
increasingly rapid communications, drove a harsh wedge between 
cosmology and history. No surprise then that the search was on, so 
to speak, for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time 
meaningfully together.101 
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Nationalism was the output for those seeking new ways of linking fraternity, 
power, and time. Thus, dynasties and religion passed from the forefront of 
humanity’s thinking as the modality for framing existence and were replaced by 
the nation-state as the repository for meaning. This is significant in that as 
meaning moves from finite definitions of space and time to a more transcendent 
or non-temporal frame of reference, these nationalisms become transferable. 
This is to say that the individuals are able to see themselves apart from a god or 
king. Thus, nationalism or nation-ness is modular, which is to say that they are 
transferable to other social terrain.102 The nation-state, because of ‘nation-ness’, 
becomes the vehicle for modernity. 
Perhaps a broader perspective, wherein both schools of thought are 
considered, is of more use. This bi-partisan position is best laid out by Adrian 
Hastings who says that, “in the later period nationalism may often have preceded 
nations rather than the reverse, in the earlier period it is far truer to say that 
nations as they grew more self-conscious, or came under threat, produced 
nationalisms.”103 Another way of reconciling the ethno-modernist debate is to see 
nationalism as Jack Snyder describes it, in light of civic and ethnic 
nationalisms.104 He classifies civic as those nationalisms that are liberal and 
inclusive. Conversely, ethnic nationalism will seek to exclude some groups at the 
expense of others.105 Returning to the greater point, there are cases of nations 
arising out of a specific ethnie, such as Japan, even as there are cases of a 
multi-ethnic nation, such as Spain as well. Each has specific historical 
trajectories that would suggest different paths to nationhood. Still, this thesis  
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argues for the modernist interpretation as the one that serves a more inclusive 
role because it is not tied to notions of ethnicity, but instead supports a more civic 
or liberal polity.  
C. NATIONALISM DEFINED 
What is nationalism? Nationalism is the highest order of identity as related 
to by the individual wherein they imagine themselves to be part of a greater 
whole, specifically the nation. Kohn notes that nationalities “come into existence 
only when certain objective bonds delimit a social group.” These objective bonds 
are shared things, saying, doings, and experiences. These ‘things’ are the 
tangible manifestation of a deeper level of consciousness. Furthermore, these 
characteristics are such things as, “common decent, language, territory, political 
entity, customs and traditions, and religion.” Yet, the most important factor is the 
decision to form the nation, this is to say that while each characteristic lends 
nation-ness, it is the decision to become the nation whereby the imagined 
becomes the community.106 This ideal is grounded in the post-enlightenment 
ideology where by one may for the first time see themselves as more than part of 
a family, clan, or religion. Thus, nationalism is an imagined community (nation), 
both limited and sovereign.107  
1. The Nation as Imagined 
A nation ultimately exists in the minds of its citizens, who may never meet, 
but live and die as one nation.108 This view of nationalism encompasses the 
belief among a people that they are distinct from another nation because of 
particular attributes. This modern sense of identity, which is fluid and dynamic 
and includes such things as common culture, history, kinship, language, religion, 
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territory, a founding moment, and a shared sense of destiny. This implies that the 
identity of a nation arises from the, “consciousness of forming a group on the ‘felt’ 
closeness.”109 This felt closeness could remain latent for years. However, once 
awakened, this imagined closeness, which is more effervescent than real, 
provides a ‘feeling’ that links the disparate peoples of a nation together. This 
internalization of a common feeling of togetherness will charge the person 
emotionally thus giving the person a distinctively psychological dimension to their 
understanding of identity. This aspect of an imagined community describes the 
transcendent nature of a nation. There is, in a nation, an aspect in which there is 
understanding of what it means to be a citizen beyond that which is written in 
something like a constitution or code of law. This may include, but is not limited 
to, culture. It is the way in which people, of disparate neighborhoods and 
counties, conceive of themselves as a nation. A nation imagined is how people of 
diverse heritage and social class can regard themselves as one society. 
2. The Nation Fraternal 
A nation is imagined as a community, because, regardless of how 
disproportionate the distribution of wealth or power is, the nation always 
conceives of itself in deep, horizontal comradeship. It is this fraternity that 
ultimately makes so many people willingly give their lives for their nation.110 This 
fraternal feeling is based on such things as values, beliefs, customs, 
conventions, habits, languages, and practices of a nation. The culture of a nation 
allows for a shared feeling of solidarity for a nation by allowing its citizens to 
imagine themselves as distinct from other nations.111  
In a very fundamental way, meanwhile, national history makes people 
closer to their ancestors and this strengthens their subjective belief in being part 
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of an extended family. “Feelings of transcendence and immortality are infused 
into individuals made aware of their role as pieces of a chain, that in spite of 
some transformations, remains constant and unique.”112 History provides an 
identity of belonging to something larger than oneself. A nation exists then, when 
the idea of the nation is powerful enough to bring together disparate individuals 
into a communal conception of brotherhood. It is this precise aspect of 
community that ultimately binds all citizens in a way where they are no longer 
north or south, black or white, but rather a people. In this way, the imagined 
community defines a nation. 
3. The Nation as a State 
A nation is imagined as limited because even in the largest of them, such 
as China or India, there are finite, if somewhat elastic at times, boundaries. 
Furthermore, no nation imagines itself as coterminous with all mankind. Even the 
most messianic of nationalists do not profess of a day when all man will join their 
nation, even if it were possible.113 People are tied to the land in which they live. 
Even in today’s society one finds that where they live determines what type of 
food they eat, where their children go to school, what style of home they live in, 
and what they do for entertainment. The land in which they live dictates to all 
areas of life. This is true today just as much as it was a hundred years ago. 
However, there is a difference today and this is seen in the rise of mass media 
and universal education. It is through these two mediums that people from 
London and Bath, while geographically separate, can nonetheless conceive of 
themselves as from England.114 
Historically, it is easy to identify with the immediate area, this is tribalism, 
but it is through education and the mass media that one is able to conceive of 
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them territorially. Benedict Anderson highlights this rise of mass media and 
education through the recounting of the process by which Siam came into being. 
Anderson, drawing on Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul, notes that until the 
ascension of Rama IV in 1851 there were only two types of maps existent in 
Siam, the first was a ‘cosmograph’ (the formal representation of the Three 
Worlds of traditional Buddhist theology), and the second type consisted of 
diagrams for military campaigns and coastal shipping. What is interesting about 
these two maps were that neither demarcated borders and were almost always 
generated locally for local use. Then with the rise of print capitalism and 
education in Siam, in the 1870’s, Thai leaders began to think of boundaries as 
segments of, “a continuous map-line corresponding to nothing visible on the 
ground, but demarcating an exclusive sovereignty wedged between other 
sovereignties.” Accordingly, in 1882, Rama V established a special school for 
cartography in Bangkok. The rise of print capitalism and the new conceptions of 
spatial reality had significant impact on Thai politics in that for the first time the 
term ‘country’ came into the lexicon of the Thai.115 Thus, bounded political space 
is central to the creation of a national identity. In part, the definition of a nation is 
to the boundaries within which it exists. A nation is American and therefore is not 
Canadian. In this way, the nation is limited to geo-spatial and semi-ethnic 
boundaries. However, this is not to say that a nation is necessarily homogenous, 
only that it is homogenous in respect to other nations.  
4. The Nation as Social Contract 
Lastly, a nation is imagined as being, or aspires to be, a sovereign state 
because it is made up of individuals who are willing to divest themselves of their 
right to violence, thus, empowering the state to actualize the concept of nation-
ness. This imagining of sovereignty is a result of the convergence of the twin 
historical arcs of the death of cosmological and dynastic realms. The idea of a 
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nation came into being in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution, necessarily 
destroying the concept of a divinely –ordained, hierarchal dynastic realm.116 The 
nation then becomes the symbol of mankind’s liberation from God and monarchy 
by appropriating power for itself in the form of the nation-state. Thus, the people 
come to rule themselves. 
The transition in which people come to rule themselves is easily seen in 
post World War II Japan. Here this element of post-war enlightenment came to 
pass in Japan as a result of the emperor descending from on high. It must be 
remembered that the emperor was a direct descendent of the sun goddess 
Amaterasu and ruled a theocracy. The Japanese lived in a world where the 
emperor embodied the nation – the emperor was the national polity.117 This is 
why the shift from a cosmological dynasty to a sovereign nation-state is so 
striking. Individual Japanese sovereignty arose through two events that radically 
altered the way in which the people saw themselves. The two watersheds were 
the emperor’s declaration of humanity and his country tour.  
In the first address to his subjects since the radio announcement of 
capitulation, the emperor again addressed his people through a press release 
entitled, “Rescript to Promote National Destiny.” Popularly known as his 
declaration of humanity, this statement was met with great acclaim from the 
international community118; however, it had a much greater resonance with the 
Japanese. The key paragraph follows: 
I stand by my people. I am ever ready to share in their joys and 
sorrows. The ties between me and my people have always been 
formed by mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon 
mere legends or myths. Nor are the predicated on the false 
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conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese are 
superior to other races and destined to rule the world.119  
The second event that changed the way the people began to view 
themselves in regard to the emperor was a series of tours that saw the emperor 
travel a total of 165 days and close to 33,000 kilometers over several years. 
These tours marked the beginning of the transformation of the monarch into a 
celebrity.120 The tours were an exceedingly painful undertaking for the rigidly 
formal Hirohito. However, he bore up under the weight of them in, “such stolid, 
uncomplaining discomfort that, in unanticipated ways, he actually became an 
intimate symbol of suffering and victimization of his people. As often as not, they 
felt sorry for him.”121 To the people, it was like the day that you finally realized 
that your father was human and this brought both embarrassment as well as 
revelation. There is a saying in Japan that, “you can gaze upon the lords, but 
looking at the shogun will make you blind; and the emperor cannot be seen at 
all.”122 It was this mix of imperial mysticism, combined with the exposure of the 
man behind the curtain that the common man was not supposed to pay mind to, 
that, “touched a sad, but subdued chord of nationalism, or at least national 
regret”123 in the people. To them the emperor had descended; sovereignty had 
come to the people. 
D. THE EFFICACY OF NATIONALISM 
Nationalism lowers transaction cost in a society by providing a common 
culture and context, which all citizens are able to drawn on. Thus, the efficacy of 
nationalism is that it allows for increasing measures of connectedness in a 
society. Shortly after the American Revolutionary War, George Washington, now 
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fifty-two returned to Mount Vernon to take stock of his life and the future of the 
nation. His property was run down after eight years of absence due to service to 
his nation. His personal estates were scattered and in disarray, not unlike the 
state of the fledging nation, and not for the first time he mused that the main 
problem facing America was that of the tyranny of distance. America was a vast 
country and growing more every year. His diaries show what was of chief 
concern to him: the impact of distance on American economy, social life, and 
opportunity.124 For Washington, if the nation was to survive, it must begin to see 
itself as such. 
What Washington has so adeptly touched upon is truly a challenge of the 
nation-state today. The challenge is how does one govern the diversity that 
exists within its borders. This challenge is often compounded by the fact that as 
early America was spread geographically, so too in this day the citizens of a 
nation are spread throughout the world, many carrying several passports from 
various countries. Washington sought to bring America closer though a series of 
civil engineering projects aimed at increasing the rapidity of travel for the citizens 
of the thirteen colonies, projects such as a series of locks on the Potomac and 
Ohio Rivers.125 These efforts were for the purpose of increasing communication 
between the disparate localities. Nationalism is a way of organizing a society for 
effective mobilization; it is in this sense a form of politics.126 It is the ability to 
communicate that lowers the transaction cost in an organization and nationalism 
does this by fostering a common culture thereby providing common language 
and shared identity. All societies need symbols and rituals to survive, foster 
cohesion, and affirm the collective values and ideas that they create.127 
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E. THE NATION-STATE CONGRUENCE MODEL 
Ernest Gellner describes nationalism as a political principle that holds that 
the political and national units are congruent. This is a theory of political 
legitimacy where the ethnic boundaries do not cut across political ones.128 Put 
another way, the political boundaries are drawn in accordance to those who 
consider themselves as a singular national unit. In answer to the question of who 
is a nation, Gellner asserts that a nation exists when two men, “share the same 
culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and association 
and ways of behaving and communicating…and only if they recognize each other 
as belonging to the same nation.”129 This is describing the equation laid out by 
Hobsbawm where by the nation = state = people.130 This equation finds its roots 
in both the American and French bill of rights, though it is more implicit in the 
French model. The French Declaration of Rights of 1795 states that, “Each 
people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who 
compose it and the extent of territory it occupies. This sovereignty is 
inalienable.”131 
The simple question now follows as to why it is important that nationalism 
binds a people and lowers the transaction cost associated with the consolidation 
of a society. The answer to this is seen in the Nation-State Congruence Model 
that states that the degree to which the nation and state are in agreement will 
indicate the relative stability or instability of the nation-state. Put another way, for 
a state to function, the nation, or nationality of its citizens must be in agreement 
with the territorial limits and capacity of the state. The extent of the congruence 
between the nation and state is seen in the proportional ratio of the geopolitical 
boundaries of the state and the national aspirations of those citizens living within 
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the state. Or, said another way, “the extent to which the current division of a 
given region into territorial states reflects the national affiliations of the main 
groups in the region and their aspirations to establish states and/or to revise 
existing boundaries.”132 This is seen in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4.   The Nation-State Congruence Model 
In Figure 4, the dynamic is demonstrated where by if a society is realized 
within its own mind primarily as a nation, but is not constructed as a state 
territorially; then the result is an “unrealized” nation. The examples of this are 
seen in such communities as Quebec or Scotland where there exists the idea of 
the nation, but not a national state. Often, these “nations” make up a larger state. 
Conversely, if a case arises such as Iraq where in there is a state apparatus that 
is not realized by its citizens as a nation then the nation-state may be said to be 
failing. It is then, only when there exists the idea of a nation that is congruent to 
finite borders that a nation-state exists. This is what is meant by the congruency 
of the nation and state.  
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Kathleen Weekly makes this point abundantly clear regarding the 
Philippines. She says that, “the nation as an ideological construct cannot be 
separated from the state as a set of politico-economic structures.” The state 
reproduces the nation through such things as passports, postage stamps, and 
pledges of allegiance – acts that remind the people that they are citizens. The 
fewer of these reminders of citizenship, the weaker the tie between the state and 
people, and it is when these linkages begin to break down, as in the case of 
Chinese Filipinos or the Muslims of Mindanao, that the conception of the nation 
begins to fade.133 Therefore, the tighter the linkage between the state and the 
nation, the greater is the degree of nationalism existent in the nation-state.  
Seth Kaplan makes this argument in a slightly different form in Fixing 
Fragile States. He says that, “inappropriate institutions cause fragile states and 
that only by redesigning those institutions can dysfunctional places craft the 
commercial environments necessary to attract investment – without which no 
development can occur or be sustained – and jumpstart a self-sustaining cycle of 
growth.”134 While this may seem to contradict the earlier claims about 
nationalism as a necessary condition, it is in effect supporting the claim in that 
what Kaplan is referring to here is one of organizational fit. What is meant, is that 
a failing state is one where the state apparatus is not in congruence with the 
national leanings. Thus, the very fiber of the nation-state has a built in 
disconnect. Or, as noted before, in a failing state the hyphen is long indeed. 
To recapitulate, nationalism is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
state development. This is to say that nationalism must be present, though 
nationalism alone is not a sufficient condition for a successful outcome. This 
assertion has been argued for by demonstrating that linkage between the people 
and the state through the concept of social contract where by the state is 
responsible for the delivery of basic goods and services to its citizenry. This is, as 
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Toby Dodge describes, the ‘ideal’ state where the state is, “legitimized by its 
ability to deliver public goods to the population contained within its recognized 
borders, through a differentiated set of centralized governmental institutions”. For 
Dodge, “its capacity is ultimately grounded in the extent to which its 
administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force.”135 
This thesis has argued that by the 1970s there an increased delinking of 
the state from its ability to provide these services was getting underway. 
Moreover, the state building projects of today have nation-state-disconnect built 
into their very fiber, much more than in the past. With this established the thesis 
considered the changing role of nationalism. To demonstrate the veracity of the 
overall argument, the thesis showed that a successful nation-state is dependent 
upon the congruence of the nation and the state. Therefore it can be said that 
nationalism, or nation-ness, is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a 
successful sovereign state.  
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IV. SEEKING THE MODERN STATE II: THE FAILURE OF AND 
NEED FOR REORIENTING THE STATE BUILDING PROJECT IN 
AN INCREASINGLY GLOBAL WORLD ORDER, 1975 -2010 
The greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of 
the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, 
Naturall, or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on 
his will; such as the Power of a Common-wealth: Or depending on 
the wills of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of 
divers factions leagued.136 – Thomas Hobbes 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has been considering state building in an historical context in 
an effort to ascertain the role of nationalism in the state building project. It has 
traced the origins of state building through development economics and 
modernization theory, which focused on state-led processes. These theories 
ultimately proved inadequate for the state building project because they did not 
provide linkages between the state and the society (nation) in that they did not 
account for a cultural dimension of growth. In this respect they ultimately served 
as their own harbingers of failure. The state building projects that began after 
World War II, and in many ways began in reaction to colonialism, could not keep 
pace with an increasingly global society, especially after the New Direction 
policies Nixon introduced in the 1970s. The shift in state building went from an 
approach where the state controlled the entire project, to one where the 
economy, and more precisely, the world markets and the spirit of liberal 
capitalism, controlled the state. Consequently, the world and the nation-state 
system is today in increasing disarray.  
Because of the reaction against state-led development, the state building 
project has become, and as Chapter II delineated, an increasingly delinked and 
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fragmented project. Further complicating this is the emasculation of the 
instruments of power that a state may bring to bear. Current state building 
practices are set within the neoclassical economic model. They are operating 
with a neo-democratic development model that focuses on technocratic means 
that inevitably leads to a world of more and more de jure sovereign nation-states 
and fewer de facto sovereign nation-states. Mark Berger argues that, “at this 
world-historical juncture the nation-state system and the pursuit of modernity via 
that nation-state generally, or nation building more specifically is the key obstacle 
to the achievement of a genuinely emancipatory modernity in a global era of 
emergent oligopolistic capitalism.”137  
However, the nation-state may still serve as a means to modernity and 
benefit from globalization. The problem is the current form of the sovereign 
modern nation-state. Stable states are necessary for development. Meanwhile, 
regional frameworks are dependent upon stable states for economic and political 
wellbeing.138 We need a new understanding of the role and purpose of the 
nation-state. To this end, this chapter will first consider contemporary theories of 
state building. It will reflect on the rise of neoclassical and neo-democratic 
development theory and the cost of seeking a technocratic state building project. 
Next, it will offer an alternative to the current paradigm by considering what is 
necessary for the reorientation of the state building project. To do this, this 
chapter will conclude by revisiting the Nation-State Congruence Model and offer 
suggestions for actualizing a re-imagined nation-state.  
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B. CURRENT THEORIES OF STATE BUILDING: POST VIETNAM WAR 
TO THE PRESENT 
Two crucial errors pervade the theory and practice of state building today. 
The first is its reliance on neo-classical economics and the second is that it uses 
a flawed formulation of what the democratic process entails. The solution is to 
rediscover that nation-ness matters. This section will consider neo-classical 
economics and contemporary theories of democratization that in large part 
provide the basis for the theory and practices of state building today.  
The rise of neo-classical economics by the 1970s and 1980s grew out of 
the failure of development economics and classic modernization theory.139 
However, neoclassical economics, and its progeny Rational Choice Theory 
(RCT), which became a key strand of thought within political science, have not 
successfully addressed the social dynamics of the nation-state, much less its 
place in a regional or global economic framework.140 Neo-classical economic 
theory assumes that markets are a given. Countries are assumed to not only 
accumulate capital, but save it as well. At the same time, they assume that 
capital, along with technology, flows freely across borders thus achieving a 
semblance of equilibrium naturally and necessarily.141  Jeffrey Sachs points out 
“the optimism of neoclassical economics is sustained by the view that flawed 
economic institutions are swept away by institutional competition or through 
public choice.”142 In the neoclassical model, it is common to believe that less-
developed countries can easily be set on the path to developed status given the 
appropriate means.143 The formula is Capital + Labor + Technology = Economic 
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Development. The solution set is one where the right arrangement of key 
variables will produce a similar outcome, regardless of the particulars of the 
case. This solution set resonates with Henry Mintzberg’s theory of organizational 
design, which stresses that because organizations have natural structures, 
harmony among the various parts may be the deciding factor in organizational 
success.144 In this fashion, the solution set for state building becomes merely a 
proper alignment of institutions, which is of course presupposing that there is a 
nation to begin with.145 Neoclassical economics, meanwhile, regards economic 
growth as something that occurs with little or connection to state processes. In 
addition, there is no mention in the neoclassical model of the role of culture or 
society.146 It is not surprising that the neoclassical model in its purest form did 
not last far beyond the early 1990s. Meanwhile, beginning with the fall of the 
Berlin wall, a shift began wherein RCT entered the development debate. RCT 
argues that individuals and groups act rationally in response to the information at 
their disposal. 147 In the early 1990s, both neoclassical economists and 
proponents of RCT pointed to the “Asian Miracle” as evidence of what can be 
accomplished if the actors made rational decisions concerning economic 
development.148 
The path by which a nation-state moves towards democracy is eerily 
similar to the economic development trajectory prescribed by neoclassical 
economics. The contemporary state building project operates on the assumption 
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that all one needs is a constitution, a vote, and bingo: you have a democracy. 
This formulation is like the neoclassical economic model of capital, labor, and 
technology in that just as economists viewed the infusion of capital and 
technology as sufficient conditions for economic growth, the technocratic 
approach to democratization views the introduction of a constitution and 
universal suffrage as sufficient conditions for democracy, state-development, and 
stability.  
In September of 2003, Paul Bremer, then the head of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, released a curious op-ed article in the 
Washington Post. This article, apparently not approved by the administration in 
Washington, laid out a seven-step road map for the transfer of power from the 
Americans to the Iraqis. This road map boiled down to three goals essentially: a 
constitution, elections, and transfer of power. Once it became evident that this 
plan was going to take a long time, the administration in Washington released a 
revised version that actually sought to transfer sovereignty on a shortened 
timeline – a mere eight months. What is more astounding is that the second plan 
actually called for a transfer of power prior to the establishment of a constitution 
and elections.149  
Another example of the neo-democratic development model is the work of 
Larry Diamond, who spent a period in Iraq, ostensibly as a senior advisor on 
democratization to Paul Bremer. In an essay, reflecting on what “went wrong” in 
Iraq; Diamond argued that they should have held elections as early as possible in 
order to put a uniquely Iraqi face on the government. It was his belief that this 
would have led to a greater sense of legitimacy for the government of Iraq. 150 
However, he does note that this may not be advisable in all cases. The point 
here though, is that there exists to this day, a predilection to emphasize the 
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importance of elections, early and often, to facilitate democratization. Thus, it is 
that a constitution + elections = democracy.  
In general, the assumptions made by neoclassical economic and neo-
democratic political models are that there exists a natural inclination to move 
towards social order. This is to say that both approaches disavow the notion of a 
social contract where by an individual invests their “choice” in an institution when 
a reciprocal relationship has been established, not before. In short, culture 
matters, society matters, and the nation matters. The current state building 
theories have naively assumed liberal democratic institutions are naturally 
occurring phenomena. Thus, the continued failing of the neo-economic and neo-
democratic models is based in the fact that natural ordering in society does not 
occur. The market and international actors will continue in the most Hobbesian of 
conflicts in a true war against all and subsequently will expand the legitimacy 
gap. Daniel W. Drezner’s article, “Sovereignty for Sale” provides a good example 
of the problem. In it he keenly observes, that the while the nation-state is under 
siege by bureaucracies and capital markets, more often than not, “sovereignty's 
erosion is as likely to occur by choice as by force.” He goes on to say that, 
“today, many small countries voluntarily auction off their sovereignty to the 
highest bidder, reaping great rewards in the process.”151 Drezner proceeds to 
illustrate this point by relating several interesting historical and current facts.  
In the 19th century, Hawaiian sugar producers compromised their 
sovereignty to gain access to the US market duty-free. During the Cold War, 
Third World rulers were not shy about trading basing rights or UN votes in 
exchange for superpower protection or foreign aid.152 Consider also the market 
for Country-Code Domain Names (CCTLDS) on the World Wide Web. These are 
the two letter designators for web addresses such as .uk for Great Britain or .de 
for Germany. In all there are 243 CCTLDS, one for every sovereign country and 
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territory. It would follow that the number of websites registered in a country would 
correspond to the country’s size or development level yet site registered in the 
Turks and Caicos exceed those registered in Finland. And, Tonga (independent 
only since 1970) has more sites than Greece or Turkey. Why, because these 
small countries have found it rather easy to sell their sovereignty to corporations. 
Drezner concludes that small countries pursuing economic freedom by selling 
their sovereignty would do well to remember that sovereignty, unlike tourism or 
agriculture is a non-renewable resource.153 Mark Berger makes a similar 
argument in his article, “States of Nature and the Nature of States”. He says that, 
“the uneven spread of globalization has pushed nation-states in many parts of 
the world well beyond the limits of their potential as institutions to provide security 
and development for the majority of their citizens.”154 The failure of the nation-
state in a globalized world is that as they integrate into the world economy they 
increasingly sell or relinquish their sovereignty. Order, in the nation-state is not 
naturally occurring. In this context, what is the course for the future? The answer 
is a reshaping of the state building project via a renewed emphasis on a greater 
alignment of nation and state. 
C. CONSTRUCTING THE NATION-STATE: THE RESHAPING OF THE 
STATE BUILDING PROJECT 
The nation-state is imagined along particular lines and therefore has 
particular characteristics. This thesis has described the nation-state as an 
imagined community that is metaphysical, fraternal, territorially defined, and 
based upon a social contract. This thesis has also argued that the idea of the 
nation came into being only in the wake of the crossing of particular historical 
arcs, namely the waning of dynastic power and pre-modern cosmology. 
Moreover, since the onset of industrialization, ideas regarding, “nation-states, 
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republican institutions, common citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags 
and anthem….and the liquidation of their conceptual opposites: dynastic 
empires, monarchical institutions, absolutisms, subjecthoods, inherited nobilities, 
serfdoms, ghettos, and so forth,” have become transferable.155 In other words, 
the nation-state and the ideology that surrounds it, is as Anderson notes, a 
cultural artefact of a particular kind, one that is transferable from one society to 
another.156 Thus, the American notion of liberal democracy is not limited to 
America. It can, and is, re-imagined and spread around the world.  
Meanwhile, the Nation-State Congruence model indicates that where 
there are state structures, but no idea of nation-ness, no nation-state exists 
(Figures 4 and 5). Conversely, if there is a sense of nationalism and yet not state 
institutions, there exists an unrealized state. The current theory and practice of 
state building has not addressed this dynamic because it has focused on the 
market and institutions as the end in themselves when in fact they are but means 
to the end, which is a stable nation-state. Because of this, there is a dramatic 
need to reshape the state building project. Figure 5 describes the two 
movements necessary to the success of a state building project.  
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Figure 5.   The Nation-State Congruence Model II 
The first dynamic (A) is the process by which an unrealized nation is 
brought into congruence with an actualized state. This dynamic (A) is that of 
state building where there is a realignment of the state apparatus to more 
accurately reflect the unrealized nation. As previously discussed, this process 
includes the consolidation of the monopoly on violence by the state over a 
population. However, there are occasions where this will prove impossible, for 
example Palestine or India-Pakistan in 1947-1948, where the proper response is, 
or might have been to redraw territorial boundaries. Other mechanisms for this 
are the strengthening of state capacity, which allows the state to provide 
essential goods and services to its citizens.157 Ghani and Lockhart describe 
these mechanisms as state functions and suggest ten functions that a state must 
carry out in order to fulfill its citizen’s aspirations for inclusion and 
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development.158 They are: rule of law, a monopoly on violence, administrative 
control, sound management of public finances, creation of citizenship rights 
through social policy, provision of infrastructure services, formation of a market, 
management of public assets, effective public borrowing, and investment in 
human capital.159 Ghani and Lockhart assert that it is when these functions are 
carried out that there begins a clustering effect that is synergistic and creates a, 
“virtuous circle in which decisions in the different domains reinforce 
enfranchisement and opportunity for the citizenry.”160 These are the civic 
institutions whereby a government performs the functions that its population 
expects it to.161  
The second dynamic (B) described in Figure 5 is that of nation building 
wherein strategies are employed to create a sense of nationalism.162 This 
dynamic is the most overlooked and yet most necessary for the establishment 
and health of the nation-state. This is the process by which a state enfranchises 
its citizens. This is done through the fulfillment of the social contract, which 
creates buy-in to the idea of the nation. Still, it is not enough to simply fulfill the 
social contract; there must be an effort to frame the nation within the borders of 
the state thereby bringing the nation into a congruent relationship with the state. 
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This process refers to growing loyalty of the citizens to the state.163 There are 
several methods through which this is accomplished.  
At the most basic level, the necessary condition for implementing the 
second dynamic (B) is the art of association. De Tocqueville, when describing 
America, points to this as the key factor that allows for consensus on the larger 
items. Free institutions, he argues, “provide a thousand reminders to each citizen 
that he lives in society. They constantly impress this idea upon his mind, that it is 
duty as well as self-interest to be useful to one’s fellows.”164 Civil and political 
associations work to carry people beyond individualism.165 Thus, a necessary 
condition for the movement from a state to a nation is the growing of what Snyder 
calls a “thick” network of liberal conceptions. This “thick” web, which consists of 
liberal institutions, values, interest-group bargains, and social ties allow for the 
channeling of political participation in liberal directions.166 Without these 
associations, and more precisely, the ability to associate, the movement from 
failed-state to nation-state will not take place. There is a need to first undergird 
the process with a conception of society that extends beyond the immediate. This 
is the first principle of nation building, the process of conceiving of the nation as 
something larger than its individual member’s sense of personal identity. This 
leads to the second aspect of nation building – social capital. 
Social capital is defined as the instantiated set of informal values and 
norms that are held by a group or society that allows for mutual cooperation.167 
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Social capital allows for lower transaction cost between individuals in a society 
because it has to do with the amount of trust in a society. The importance of this 
is crucial when it comes to nation building. Social capital is generated among the 
citizens as they enter into civil and political associations with each other. They 
begin to trust one another and this ultimately allows for increased levels of 
cooperation. At the same time, there is a level of social capital that is created 
through the delivery of basic goods and services to the citizens by the state. 
When the state provides these services, the nation begins to trust the state as 
the legitimate fulfiller of the social contract. 
A third predominant factor in the rise of a cohesive national identity is that 
of an extensive vernacular literature.168 Gellner speaks extensively of this 
particular point, emphasizing that it is only through the process of universal 
education that a modern society is able to achieve a form of cohesiveness. This 
is a necessary condition in that education allows for the modularization of the 
individual within society, thus allowing for social mobility.169 The tenet of social 
mobility is what the idea of liberal democracy is built upon. Unlike in a previous 
era, when everyone’s place in the world was determined by birth and locked in by 
hereditary law the idea of the nation is grounded in an understanding of popular 
sovereignty wherein all men are created equal. For example, in his proclamation 
in 1945 of a Vietnam independent from French rule, Ho Chi Minh quoted 
extensively from Thomas Jefferson and opened his remarks with the statement, 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident.”170 Literacy, education, and a diffuse 
vernacular not only allow for greater and easier lines of communication, but also 
in actuality allow for a greater degree of egalitarianism. 
A fourth factor that leads to the rise of a national identity is that of conflict. 
Adrian Hastings argues that, “a long struggle against an external threat may also 
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have a significant effect.”171 Similarly, Bruce Porter has argued that, “war is a 
demonstrably organized and organizing, phenomenon… a powerful catalyst of 
change… states make war, but war also makes states. The origins of the modern 
state, its rise and development, are inextricably linked with violent conflict and 
military power.”172 This creation of common enemies is powerful because it often 
leads to the consolidation of a sense of community among the individuals of a 
society173 provided that the conflict is intrastate. 
In summary, nation building (dynamic B in Figure 5) is the process by 
which the construction of the “image” of a nation takes place. This is done by the 
construction of a common history and a shared culture over a demarcated 
geographic space. It includes the creation of symbols that have meaning and the 
sharing of ideas and ideology.174 Most importantly though, it is about consensus 
building by which the nation is brought into congruence with the state. The 
congruence of the nation and state is the process of nation-state building. It is 
precisely to the degree that the two are brought into alignment that there will exist 
a stable nation-state. Thus, nationalism is a necessary condition for state 
building. 
 
                                            
171  Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism, 2. 
172  Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundation of Modern 
Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1994), xiv-xv and 1. 
173  Guibernau, The Identity of Nations, 25. 
174  Ibid., 25. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This paper began with a statement that the world has become normal 
once more. While there is a degree of accuracy in this statement, it is not entirely 
true. There has been a resurgence of major powers, as well as a rise of the rest. 
Yet, the world is still remarkably different from the one in which the idea of the 
nation-state was born some two hundred years ago. The past sixty years has 
seen a decline in state-centered development, the rise of a global market, and 
the introduction of transnational actors who answer to neither state nor nation. 
Consequently, there has been a movement of popular sovereignty, and the 
resulting social capital, away from the state. Meanwhile, the hyphen between 
nation and state has grown longer.  
The nation-state must now seek its place in a new global order. What is 
interesting to note is that this is does not necessarily involve a fundamental 
change in the global political economy, but it does involvement moving the level 
of analysis upward and downward. The movement upward is one of layering 
where liberal democratic nationalistic ideals – liberty, equality, and fraternity – are 
not subsumed by the onset of globalization, but are instead buttressed by it.175 In 
this way, globalism is merely an expansion of existing values and beliefs. In fact, 
for the true liberal it is the logical manifestation of the process. Similarly, there is 
a movement of sovereignty downward. These new or strengthened levels of 
identity necessarily expand the individual’s level of responsibility by expanding 
their degree of connectedness. In short, personal sovereignty not only moves 
downward, but upward as well.  
For the nation-state as we know it to survive and prosper, there is a need 
for the reorientation of state building projects to encompass a far better 
understanding of the role of democratic or civic nationalism. The reason for this is 
that nationalism is a necessary condition for state development. Without a 
                                            
175  Guibernau, The Identity of Nations, 195. 
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genuinely inclusive nationalism or national identity the nation-state is either 
unrealized or failing. In either case the cause of regional stability is hurt, if not 
side tracked all together. Thus the nation-state must be reoriented within its own 
context as well as the greater global order. This is the only way that leads to 
greater stability in the nation-state and region in the early 21st century. Thus, 
without a vibrant and inclusive nationalism, a modern nation-state is nothing but 
a hollow and shambolic bureaucratic edifice with steadily increasing limits on its 
ability to provide even the most minimum requirements to the citizens that live 
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